

THE ASPEN INSTITUTE

WHAT ARE THE WORLD'S CRISIS SPOTS?

Greenwald Pavilion  
1000 N, Third Street  
Aspen, Colorado, 81612

Friday, June 29, 2012

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GOLDBERG: We're just going to wait for Jane to finish the Starbucks and then we'll start.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: He is the morning Joe Mason.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, good. Is it morning? Is it still morning? Good morning, welcome to our foreign policy panel 2.0. Just they did one before. This one is going to be a lot better. Trust me.

MS. HARMAN: Because you rehearsed.

MR. GOLDBERG: Ah?

MS. HARMAN: Because you rehearsed.

MR. GOLDBERG: Because I rehearsed so much. I'm Jeff Goldberg from the Atlantic. Thank you for coming. We have a great panel. You know who they are. If you don't, you have various propagandas from the Aspen Ideas Festival to tell you who they are. But Richard Haass is on my far left, just unusual. Far -- yeah.

(Laughter)

MR. HAASS: That actually makes sense.

MR. GOLDBERG: Richard Haass is in the radical center. Jane Harman, you all know. Nick Burns with whom I just did an hour conversation on foreign policy, this one is going to be completely different. What we're going to do, the topic is hot spots, sort of the big country by country challenges the U.S. is facing now and in the near to middle term. And in order to be fair to all the countries, I'm just going to go through every country. So I want to go --

(Laughter)

MR. HAASS: All 196.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes. So we want to start with the Andorra problem. Or, you know, you can talk about the special relationship between the U.S. and Andorra and then we'll just move right through. Nobody -- you know, Andorra has never been mentioned at the Aspen Ideas Festival.

MR. HAASS: Now it has.

MR. GOLDBERG: So I feel really I think they should underwrite this from now on.

MR. HAASS: It's equal to their GDP.

MR. GOLDBERG: Equal to their GDP. So I thought we would just jump in and do some of the obvious hot spots and then talk about some of the longer challenges. I know that Richard and Jane are rearing to have an argument about Egypt. So I want to start with Egypt. And Richard, can you start us off by talking about what's happened in the last couple of weeks, what it means and where you think this country is headed. And do it in a minute.

MR. HAASS: I'll take 20 seconds of the minute to set the stage. What happens in Egypt matters dramatically. It's somewhere between a quarter and a third of the Arab world and Cairo is one of the greatest, if not the greatest city of the Arab world. So the stakes are large politically. Egypt has also been an important partner of the United States whether it's with the Israeli-

Palestinian talks, in the efforts against terrorism or generally promoting international order.

It's now been, what, about a year, a-year-and-a-half since the Al Siya (phonetic) regime was ousted and what we've seen is a series of efforts, we've had a series of elections, and the most recent development is obviously now you have a weak presidency led by the Muslim Brotherhood, you have the military still playing a large role in political life, you have no constitution and you have no parliament. And I would simply say that this is a situation that cannot last.

Nick, you've got it -- the battle grounds will be the relationship between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, which now controls the presidency, what are the powers between the two, right now heavily tilted towards the military. I don't think that can survive, because I think sooner or later there will be a showdown between the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood who are large in number and the military.

And I think the military will be scared to use force, will be scared to confront them too directly for fear that either the soldiers won't follow through on the orders, or if they were to, it would mean a massive loss of legitimacy. The big battle though will ultimately be in the constitution because that's ultimately going to determine the division of power within the government, between the government and society.

And the questions are enormous in part because we know very little about the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of how it would actually rule. A year ago almost all of them were in jail or in the streets. Now they are in positions of power. We know what they said. We don't know what it is they are going to do. We don't know exactly what the military is willing to step back from.

And all this is new. Egypt has had several voting events, but electocracy is not a democracy. And I would simply say however far Egypt has traveled, it pales in significance to the distance it needs to travel. And

I'll just say one last thing, the one set of actors I haven't mentioned are those who to some extent help get things underway in Tahrir Square, the liberal, more secular parties.

I think those forces are not terribly well organized and at the moment they don't look to be decisive though there is a large body of Egyptians who clearly favor a more secular Egypt. They did quite well in the recent -- in the rounds of the presidential elections. I would simply say that Egypt is up for grabs in many ways and the ability of the United States or any other outsider to meaningfully influence that trajectory is not clear to me.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane, do you think that the Google kids, the liberals who began this, are going to go back out into Tahrir Square now that they've been boxed out of governance? Can you just --

MS. HARMAN: Well, I'm more bullish. Let me set the stage for a slightly different take and explain why

I'm more bullish and then what I think they might do. I've been do Egypt twice in the last year. I was there for the first round of presidential voting just a few weeks ago and I was there right after the Tunisian election last fall where I was an observer, and that period was right before the parliamentary election.

So I've met everybody, Muslim Brotherhood folks, I'm sure Richard has several times, Salafis and a cross-section of activists, some who were elected to parliament who were in secular parties, some who weren't et cetera, et cetera. Why I'm more bullish is that this -- their own history shows that it takes a while to form a pluralistic government. I mean, we started in the 1776. We really didn't have a government until 1789. That's 13 years.

And I think that would be horrific to contemplate for Egypt. But it has only been 18 months and there is progress. I believe that in that week when Egypt went dark after the presidential runoff, that there had to be, I don't know this, conversations between the

Brotherhood and the SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces about (inaudible), and how this was going to work going forward. I don't think -- I'm quite sure that happened.

And I think the result of that will be a weaker presidency than the Brotherhood wants but a functioning presidency, and a reassurance for the SCAF that they will be able to keep what they got during the Mubarak era. That may trouble a lot of people including me, but I think in the net if they keep that and the country is stable and a democracy can begin to grow -- a democracy is not an election, Richard's right, I think that that's a trade we should make for the near period.

In any rate, I think those conversations occurred. I think the parliament will be reformed and a do-over, I don't know how much of an election will have to be held, I mean it was -- the supreme court opinion on the parliament was only that -- or the high court, I don't think it's called the Supreme Court -- opinion was only

that a 100 seats out of 500 were nullified because they were elected by party slates.

But then the SCAF abolished the parliament. I think there's a way to patch that up. I think a lot of people will be reelected there and maybe it will be the opportunity for some women to be added. They were boxed out in the first rounds, and that could be better.

And then comes the constitution which won't be a perfect document, but to our mind, Richard, the Muslim Brotherhood is full of capitalists. They are good business people, many of them. They are quite wealthy and they want Egypt's economy to recover. They have got to understand, and I'm sure they do, that if they vitiate the treaty with Israel and if they take the country hard right to a, you know, not just Sharia laws principles, but Sharia laws as actual articles in the constitution, no one will want to go there.

And I so I don't think that happens. I think they are going to have to show results and I think there

will be a group of people from a variety of view points who takes the largest Muslim country in the Arab region and develops something out of it. So that's my view.

MR. GOLDBERG: Nick, can we count on the rationality of the Muslim Brotherhood?

MR. BURNS: I think it's a highly ration organization but it's not a united organization. It's been around since 1928. It has a long history, but it's riven by factional disputes right now. So one of the big questions we've got to look for here, answer is, which Muslim Brotherhood is going to show up at that constitution writing assembly.

MS. HARMAN: Right.

MR. BURNS: I would just make two points, and I actually agree with a lot of what both Richard and Jane have said. Two things for us to look forward as Americans; there's a dramatic showdown underway between the military authorities on the one hand and the new government on the other. And it's not as if they are

going to break apart. I think actually we're beginning to see some signs that they are working together. Not easily, but they are beginning to make some tradeoffs and compromises and we should hope that that continues.

And this gets to the second point. The second point is that President Obama faces an array of extremely policy choices here. We've got competing interests. On the one hand we have to support, I think, democratization and these elections and the results of these election in the Arab world. We can't do what we in the Bush administration did. We didn't like the result in Gaza when Hamas won. So we just walked away.

If we are one of the primary supporters of this election, we've got to work with the Muslim Brotherhood government. President Obama has done that. He called Mohammed Morsi on Sunday. We're obviously trying to use our best influences to convince the Muslim Brotherhood, keep the Camp David Accords with Israel, don't embark on a radical course in foreign policy, find a way to work with

the military.

On the other hand, Jeff, as we were just talking about earlier this morning, we also have some pragmatic interest tied up in Egypt. Egypt has been a blocking agent against Iran, part of the blocking coalition that we put together. Egypt has been ally against al-Qaida. Egypt has its peace treaty with Israel and Israel, of course, is a primary interest. And so since the beginning year --

MS. HARMAN: The Suez Canal.

MR. BURNS: And the Suez Canal. You've seen the president, you know, kind of up in a high wire without a net juggling these competing priorities. That continues. I agree with Richard, this drama is going to be written by the Egyptians, not by the Americans. Those days are over when we can impose a solution, but we've got some leverage. And if we exercise it, I would say, largely privately behind the scenes, not through Twitter, Facebook and soapbox statements -- we've got \$1.3 billion in badly

needed aide to the Egyptians.

We also have a 30- to 40-year personal relationship between our senior military leaders and Egypt's senior military leaders. So this is where diplomacy kicks in. Can we operate effectively behind the scenes to kind of push these two unlikely actors together, the military and Muslim Brotherhood, and keep them going on some kind of centrist path. It may not work out that way, but that's where American policy should stay focused.

MS. HARMAN: Can I just add one thing on the aide thing? Just one second. The \$1.3 is military aide. Then there's \$250,000 in --

MR. BURNS: Not million, billion.

MS. HARMAN: Billion. All these zeros.

MR. BURNS: Right.

MS. HARMAN: -- of government --

MR. GOLDBERG: We've got a true congresswoman by the way, right?

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: Thank you, thank you Jeffrey.

(Cross talk)

MS. HARMAN: Yeah. \$250 million civilian aide and \$50 million more in some other kind of special deal. They are in different pots. And just to make this point, Congress conditioned the \$1.3 billion on certain benchmarks being reached. Hillary Clinton waived those benchmarks in March, but retained some authority to take it back. I would say that we should give all the civilian aide and plus it up. I think we should condition some of the military aide on the performance of the SCAF.

MR. GOLDBERG: Richard, you could respond to that if you want. I also want to put this on the table. What would be the consequences of an abrogated Camp David Accord? What will be the consequences if Egypt decides, you know what, we don't have peace with Israel anymore; doesn't mean necessarily we're going to war, but no peace.

MR. HAASS: One aide, I would condition it. I would basically make it clear -- and I would do it in more

and more countries, whether it is Pakistan or Egypt. Blank check, hope-for-the-best aide is a nonstarter. And we ought to make it clear what our criteria are. There's got to be a reason. We want to Egypt to succeed. We want Egypt to gradually move in the direction of a greater democratization, greater market economics. And we've got to use aide to incentivize that.

But for example, if there is abrogation of the treaty, we shall talk about in a second, or there is terrible ill-treatment of, say, the 10 million or so Coptic Christians in Egypt and so forth, there ought to be a price for that. There can't be on conditional aide or simply aide in the hope that good stuff happens. It ought to be aide specifically tied to behaviors.

If the treaty were to be abrogated, and needless to say I hope it's not, and I don't think it will be, but it were to be abrogated, what do we do is essentially reintroduce to the Middle East a level of history that we haven't seen there. Or to put it in another way, from

Israel's point of view, Israel has always had three securities fears.

It had a distance fear which used to be Iraq and is now Iran, which is the one that preoccupies them most. It's had this fear of its contiguous neighbors - Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which is this fear that for several decades was largely quieted, since the '73 war in many ways, formally and -- formally with Jordan and Egypt, informally with Syria, most messily with Lebanon, was largely quieted. And then you had the internal fear, if you will, the Palestinian one.

If you reopen the contiguous fear, which the Egyptian treaty would do, it would be a transforming moment for Israeli security policy. Israeli strategic planners, who've already begun to hedge a little bit against that possibility would have to do a lot more than hedge. It would essentially reopen this third strategic arena. For Israel, it would be strategically a terrible development.

Psychologically and politically though, I think it would make it very hard for future Israeli governments to make peace because what it would tell them is that we give up things that are real territory in exchange for political promises, but given the political unpredictability of the Arab world, that's a bad trade. So I think it would have repercussions as large as they would be beyond the immediate strategic consequences for Israel and for Egypt.

MR. GOLDBERG: You know, you say abrogation doesn't seem to be in the cards, but if you asked --

MR. HAASS: I didn't say that. I said I think it's likely.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, likely. But if you -- if we had this panel last year and I asked people what are the chances that Egypt is going to have a president from the Muslim Brotherhood, we know what people thought a year ago. The Muslim Brotherhood said it wasn't going to run a candidate and they changed their mind. So I mean, let me

focus this on the Sinai for a second and Nick and maybe Jane can jump in.

The Sinai Peninsula has become this zone of chaos. It resembles in some unfortunate ways some parts of Yemen, some parts of the tribal areas of Pakistan now. Terrorist attacks are launched from Sinai into Israel. What are the changes that the Egyptian military won't have the will or the capacity to pacify that area? What are the chances that Israel would have to actually go in and do it because that would be an enormous game changer?

MR. HAASS: This is a real problem for Israel and the United States. My family and I lived in both Egypt and Israel in the '80s and we used to travel frequently throughout the Sinai down to Sharm el-Sheikh across from Jerusalem to Cairo and the El Arish (phonetic) road, and it was quiet and it was stable and that was the result of peace that Jimmy Carter was able to negotiate March of 1979. I agree. I think there are big consequences here.

If the Muslim Brotherhood decides, I don't think it will either, to abrogate or weaken its accord, it poses a real problem practical for the Israelis because all of a sudden the buffer zone that they have that Richard described for the last 30 years or so has receded. And if you couple that with the uncertainty of what happens in Syria, and the Syrian-Israeli border has been solid and stable since 1973, suddenly Israel becomes in all of its borders worried about stability, worried about attacks and it will make and should make the Israelis less interested in some of these grandiose peace deals when they can't trust the commitments that Arab countries have made.

So I think that the Muslim Brotherhood is not going to pick this fight. If they pick this fight, they lose the United States, they lose the American people, they lose the Europeans, they lose some of the other Arab states. I think they are going to try to get -- they are going to try to position themselves to have as much authority and leverage on the writing of the constitution.

That's the big, big project now because that will decide who has power in Egypt over the next several decades.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane, this is a question that would lead us into Pakistan, where we'll go next. We're going to go on a great tour today. But do you think that Egypt, you've been there twice in the last year, do you think that Egypt has the capability of actually keeping the Sinai calm by itself with its technical capabilities?

MS. HARMAN: I think, yeah, and it was a conversation that I was in. You know, I'm not going to describe the detail of it, but in a very high level conversation with senior leadership of SCAF just a few weeks ago, and I realized a lot has changed since then; however, they made absolutely clear that that's a problem that they want to take on.

It's not in their interest to have unrest in Sinai because it's a breeding ground for a lot of people who might attack them as well as attack Egypt. I just -- kind of the last comment on this, I think SCAF wants to

carve out a big lane for itself to protect what it has, and protect its prestige and make sure that no one who has in some past life done anything that the international criminal court or somebody might think is a bad thing is ever prosecuted. I think they want immunity and protection.

And I think they will try to negotiate that. I think the rest of the governance issue could be if it's adroitly managed, the province of a pluralistic government, not just an ambigovernment. And there are different strains of the Muslim Brotherhood, but -- for example, Anwar Sadat, the nephew of Anwar Sadat who looks exactly like Anwar Sadat and his wife has the same name as the late Anwar Sadat.

MR. GOLDBERG: How do you know it wasn't the actual Anwar Sadat?

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: Maybe -- you know, true. I have to think about that. It might have been Jeffery Goldberg from backside.

MR. GOLDBERG: From backside, yeah.

MS. HARMAN: So --

MR. GOLDBERG: I'm frequently mistaken for an Egyptian politician. You're right, yeah.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: He is in a center right party, secular party, and he assembled a delegation that came to Washington last week and we had a meeting at the Wilson Center and they went all over the Hill, et cetera. There was a Salafi member, there was a cop, there was a woman member of his party, there was, you know, sort of a variety of folks all of whom are optimistic that the government will get its act together and they will all play a role in it.

And I would like to believe that will be an outcome. I think there's -- you know, Egyptians, we

should not underestimate their capability. Of course, we should not underestimate our own stupidity either. But we can only affect this from the margins. And if we take -- if we nurtured this, I think there's the best chance that we will play some role in the outcome while we could.

MR. GOLDBERG: Richard, do Muslim Brotherhood and then jump on. Let's just move geographically and I want you to open up the discussion about Syria, which is obviously from an humanitarian perspective the worse crisis the world is facing, which is 200 people were murdered yesterday by the Syrian government. It's -- it hasn't been morally tenable for some while. And if you could open the -- after your Muslim Brotherhood piece, open the discussion about why we aren't doing anything?

MR. HAASS: Thirty seconds more on Egypt, which is to say I think the most dangerous scenario or difficult scenario rather for American foreign policy is not a closed Israeli relationship versus abrogation of the treaty. It's the in-between. And my prediction is we've

had a cold peace between Egypt and Israel even under the old government, the Mubarak. The question is whether that's colder and you have something like the fringed peace where you keep the formal treaty in place, but the cooperation that gave the relationship meaning and content, that goes away. And I think that's the situation. We're likely to face, a combination of will and -- lack of will and lack of capability on the Egyptian side and that will pose some very difficult problems to the Israelis.

Syria. The best way to start Syria is to juxtapose it against Egypt. Places like Egypt or Bahrain, when people set it up, they always say the United States needs to choose between strategic interest, national security interest of cooperating with the state against humanitarian interest or democracy interest. What's so interesting about Syria is the interest line up. We have humanitarian interest obviously in stopping the carnage.

Roughly what, 12,000 people plus or minus have lost their lives since it began over the last year. And we have strategic interest, particularly given the Iranian connection with the Assad regime. It's not one of those places where you've got to choose where realists and idealists, if you will, are at loggerheads. In this case there's much of a parallelism than is the case with other things.

It's not a question though I would say, where I disagree with Jeffrey, it's not that we're doing nothing. The United States is doing some things. There's sanctions and the rest. The question is what are the options. There's military intervention. We can talk about that. There's arming the opposition, which is happening largely through the Arabs. The United States is playing a slight role there covertly, and there's a version of the status quo, what I would call status quo plus or intervening without arms.

And there's a lot more we could be doing short of the others. For example, we should be threatening those who support the regime with war crimes indictments. We should be upping the sanctions. The sanctions against Syria should at least be as draconic as the sanctions against Iran or civil aviation between Syria and Europe and anywhere else, and Arab world, where we can have countries to agree with us, what could be cut off.

Arab countries who are unhappy with Syria, and many of them are, the Sunni countries, they ought to go to Russia and they ought to be pulling out ambassadors and introducing economic penalties against the Russians. We ought to be sitting 24/7 with the Syrian opposition so they make statements and they put together a serious opposition that essentially reassures the Alawites of Syria, the minority that run the country, that they will not suffer the fate of the minorities Sunnis in Iraq when Saddam was gone.

They have to know that that they have a real and safe place in the future of Syria. So I actually think there's a lot more we could do. And then we can discuss here, I don't want to take too much time, the pros and cons of the two major escalatory options, which is all-out arming of the opposition or physical military intervention, if you will, a Libya-plus scenario. I think it has major shortfalls and major problems, but we can put it on the table.

MR. GOLDBERG: But Jane, you're close to the administration and I want you to answer this question. Richard is right. There's an alignment here that you usually don't find. There's obviously a humanitarian interest. But Syria, we're talking about a regime that's Iran's foremost ally and only Arab ally; you're talking about Syria as a primary sponsor of terrorism.

There's no -- this is not an issue of, well, Mubarak is our friend, so really should we be abandoning him. This is an issue where Syria -- where the departure

of this regime could have only beneficial effects on our national security if obviously an al-Qaida government doesn't come into play which we can work on. So why does this administration seem so passive on this question?

MS. HARMAN: Because the options are absolutely terrible and there's total war fatigue in America. There's an election going on. I thought I would point that out. And there is no attack by air strategy that will, of itself, cause regime change. So that means we or some group of somebody has to go in by land, think land war, another land war, which nobody wants. That's a problem in Iran too.

I agree and I know our government agrees that Bashar should go. But I think the only real option is the Yemen option, which we can't seem to get to happen yet, but which is he goes, his family gets sanctuary some place, hopefully in Russia which is -- which should want this, want to get him out, but doesn't, and then a government is structured including Alawites.

So I completely agree with Richard. It's face saving for them, and most of them or some of them are butchers trying to destroy the rest of the population. But if that government isn't structured, there will be all-out civil war. These are people who absolutely hate each other. It's totally tribal and there are al-Qaida folks in the mix. So I think arming the opposition when we don't know who it is, is really a crazy strategy and it's going to end up with arms being used against interests that we seriously have.

MR. GOLDBERG: Nick, is it that dire? Is what she proposes that dire? I mean, is that -- are we facing no good options and no possible means of support short of, you know --

MS. HARMAN: No, I said the Yemen option is the good option.

MR. GOLDBERG: But you said it's --

MS. HARMAN: But going-in military option and arming the opposition are not good options.

MR. GOLDBERG: Let me reframe it. If you were making policy right now in the Obama administration, what would your policy be?

MR. BURNS: Well, I would just like to say -- I think that Jane's right in the sense that we've got to have a sense of restraint here. Psychologically throughout most of the last 30 or 40 years, we Americans in both Republican and Democratic administrations have tended to think that when we act, we can resolve all problems. We cannot resolve this problem through U.S. military intervention. This is not Libya for all sorts of reasons. So I think that's an important point to make. On the other hand, I think Richard makes a very important powerful point. We've got nothing to lose by focusing in on Assad and --

MR. GOLDBERG: But Jane says we do have something to lose.

MR. BURNS: I'm just trying to agree with Richard now. A typical diplomat.

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: A typical diplomat.

MS. HARMAN: Why should --

MR. BURNS: They're both friends of mine. We've all worked together.

MR. GOLDBERG: I will agree with you, Jane, in the future.

(Cross talk)

MR. BURNS: But I think there's a bridge here, and that is what does the President have to lose if he sanctions Assad to the extent that we've sanctioned Iran, as Richard suggested, and if we make his departure a clear objective of our policy. This gets to diplomacy. And I think what's happening now, Secretary Clinton is meeting the Foreign Minister L'Orion of Russia today, the U.S. is obviously trying to convince the Russians that if they want to have influence in Syria in the future, they shouldn't be the last country standing as Assad departs. The stage right or left in the next couple of months.

Assad is going to lose power. The only question is when. Can Russia be part of that solution? As Jane says --

MS. HARMAN: Or lead it.

MR. BURNS: Can they lead it and can there be a Yemen type solution. We engineered the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh from Yemen. He was promised a safe peaceful life.

MS. HARMAN: Right.

MR. BURNS: No trial for war crimes, no execution. Assad should take that deal because he'll be leaving power. Russia is the key. And the final point here, Jeff, we've got a lot of people saying that Russia is a problem. It is a problem. Governor Romney has said, not that he wants to take this back, that Russia is the greatest adversary of the United States in the world, not true. Russia is many things.

It's a very difficult country for us to deal with and it opposes us on a host of issues. But it is a partner in counter terrorism. It's been very helpful in

the resupply of our troops in Afghanistan. And Putin may hold the key on two big Middle East issues; Iran and Syria. If we're going to get an Iran deal, if, and that's a very difficult proposition to imagine, Russia is probably going to help write that deal. And the same is true with Syria. So despite our disaffection from Vladimir Putin and Sergie Lavrov, we got to work with them. And I think that's what the President is trying to do, and I think that's a sensible policy.

MR. GOLDBERG: Who is the -- what country is America's foremost adversary in the world?

MR. BURNS: Iran.

MR. GOLDBERG: No doubt in your mind?

MR. BURNS: No question about it.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane?

MS. HARMAN: I'd say, short term Pakistan, bigger problem. I read a brilliant article, forget the author, but it was called "Ally from Hell," which made a point that at least six nuke sites in Pakistan --

MR. GOLDBERG: It's a great, great article.

MS. HARMAN: -- are unstable, and nuclear materials may be driving around Pakistan -- may be driving --

(Cross talk)

MS. HARMAN: Who?

MR. GOLDBERG: She's getting me back. It's fine.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: May be driving around Pakistan -- I think he's Anwar Sadat, and -- but --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, it's crazy that Anwar Sadat is covering Pakistan for The Atlantic now.

MS. HARMAN: But Pakistan is just set up for proliferation. And I think that that is a more urgent dangerous issue than a year or two later in Iran.

MR. GOLDBERG: Stay on Pakistan. We'll loop around back to Iran. Richard, is Pakistan -- you know, it's interesting when you talk to people at CENTCOM and you ask them, you know, CENTCOM is the military command

that covers most of the dysfunctional countries of the world and they are focused like a laser on Iran. Pakistan, you know, this has been there a lot of times, is a completely dysfunctional state, which actually has nuclear weapons already. It's not theoretical with Pakistan.

MS. HARMAN: Right.

MR. GOLDBERG: How do you rank Pakistan and Iran in terms of potential crisis for this President or the next president?

MR. HAASS: Well, you don't have the luxury of choosing between them. They're both on the short list. Iran is an imperial power that wants to spread its influence throughout this critical part of the world and one of its quest is to either acquire nuclear weapons or get 90 percent of the way there because they believe it will support this imperial quest of their, and also shield them against various types of physical attack from Israel, the United States and others.

Pakistan poses a different threat. Pakistan is not an imperial power. Pakistan, the threat is not its strength, it's its weakness and it's an imploding Pakistan. It's a failing state. The question at some point is whether anyone there is read Malcolm Gladwell and the tips. What's so frightening about, you know, the numbers are stark. We're worried about Iran acquiring one, two or three nuclear weapons. Pakistan already probably has upwards of 100.

The question is what can we do if anything to try to prevent Pakistani failure and the possibility that these weapons or materials get into the wrong hands. It's already the state that's the greatest home to international terrorism. The sanctuary they provide is killing Americans in Afghanistan. So Pakistan, again, its threat is its weakness, it's dysfunctionality. For Iran, the threat is something different and Iran is on something of a quest. So there's two different challenges, two both very real, two as a result are calling forth very

different responses from the United States.

MR. GOLDBERG: Nick, do you think Pakistan is tipping or do you think it's, from -- even from the Pakistani perspective salvageable as a unitary state.

MR. BURNS: Well, it's dramatically -- the situation in Pakistan is dramatically worse today than it was 4 or 5 years ago. There's no question about that. The U.S.-Pakistan relations, at an all-time low.

MR. GOLDBERG: They've always been at an all-time low?

MR. BURNS: This is the all-time low.

MS. HARMAN: All-time lower.

MR. BURNS: You know why?

MR. HAASS: Until tomorrow --

MR. GOLDBERG: Until tomorrow, yeah. We have a panel tomorrow on the all-time low.

MR. BURNS: No trust.

MR. GOLDBERG: No trust.

MR. BURNS: Since President Obama rightly, we decided this in the last panel, went in to take out Osama bin Laden May 1, 2011, there's been no trust there. And you have now the United States looking towards a departure in Afghanistan. The President is going to take combat troops out by 2014. We're actively seeking a political deal with the Taliban.

That's going to further weaken out ties with Pakistan because the Pakistanis don't want to see that and they don't want to see India become more influential and India is positioning itself to become more influential as a protector of Karzai. So I think it's a much more problematic security environment for us in dealing with the Pakistanis.

The one thing I would say is I wouldn't predict imminent collapse. Say what you will about the sometimes treacherous, sometimes not very trustworthy Pakistani military, I think their, obviously their interest is in survival of their institution, not just their country. I

think they can probably hold the country together through this very unstable period as Afghanistan returns to a more unstable state in the future.

MS. HARMAN: Can I just add one thing on that though?

MR. GOLDBERG: Go ahead.

MS. HARMAN: You know, there's a soap opera going on in Pakistan. General Musharraf will be here in the next few days and he ultimately had to leave power because the Supreme Court headed by the guy who still heads it declared his holding power unconstitutional. And then there was an election and everyone remembers Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and her husband Zardari became the president.

Just recently the Supreme Court dismissed the prime minister because he refuses to -- I don't know what the technical word is, but make Zardari vulnerable to prosecution for corruption. And so now there's a new prime minister who won't do it either and he'll get

dismissed. And so there's going to be this sort of Saturday Night Massacre experience where no one will be in power on the civilian --

MR. GOLDBERG: Right.

MS. HARMAN: -- side in Pakistan. And what worries me about that is that if the only piece of the government left is the military, let's remember -- I think we should -- that Osama bin Laden was hiding in plain sight in a military garrison town and I think there is plenty of reason to believe he was protected and the military has refused to go against major terror groups in the country. So I don't think that that's any kind of recipe for stability of any nature and I do think Pakistan could melt down any day.

MR. GOLDBERG: Should we refrain -- should we refrain the whole Pakistan issue and say look, they're actually working against the American interest. Can we just be frank about it and deal with it as an enemy or as an adversary instead of making believe this fiction that

we're allies?

MR. HAASS: We certainly should not use the word ally. We certainly should not use the word partner. If you want to call them a limited partner I'd put "limited" in caps and "partner" in lower case. This is a relationship -- again they're providing sanctuary to terrorists. They're providing sanctuary to the groups that are undermining Afghanistan and killing Americans in Afghanistan.

They've got this enormous nuclear arsenal. A.Q. Khan, this revered figure in Pakistan was basically running the Walmart of nuclear trade. So let's not kid ourselves. This is not an ally. It's -- many ways, isn't our friend. I'm not sure we gain a whole lot by publicly calling them adversaries, something like that.

I don't think it makes sense to write countries off. Instead again, you want to come back first of all through realistic relations with them, get rid of the glitter, get rid of the idealistic hopes, approach them

for what they are, and have a extremely narrow transactional relationship. Again, we will only provide certain types of support, military support or economic support on condition of certain types of behaviors or reforms. But the idea like after 9/11 that when we pump billions and billions and billions, with double figures in front of it, of dollars into Pakistan on the hope they would be a reliable partner in the global or regional effort against terrorism was about as flawed a foreign policy as we could carry out.

MR. GOLDBERG: I want to go to the big enchilada in a minute, Liechtenstein. The --

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: Thank God, I was hoping --

MR. GOLDBERG: No, we've got to deal with that.

MR. BURNS: I'm prepared for that.

MR. GOLDBERG: If that implodes, boy, then you know --

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: As goes Liechtenstein.

MR. GOLDBERG: Then Monaco, you know, let's --  
it's a domino effect.

MR. BURNS: Domino theory, yeah.

MR. GOLDBERG: It's a domino theory, the Iran  
question. But I have this broad question that I want --  
you're all very smart and maybe you could answer this. In  
1947, the subcontinent of Asia was divided into two parts.  
One part today is the world's largest democracy, a vibrant  
economy, one of the world's largest middle classes.

The other part is Pakistan. What happened?  
Nick, I mean have you thought about this? Why did it --  
is it reversible and how did this come to pass that these  
two places that are so alike obviously in so many ways,  
what happened?

MR. BURNS: And so different.

MR. GOLDBERG: And so different.

MR. BURNS: In their founding, in their founding fathers, Muhammad Ali Jinnah or Nehru. I won't go through the history of South Asia in a minute --

MR. GOLDBERG: No, could you?

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: I won't. I'll spare you, but I'd like to just -- one more point --

MR. GOLDBERG: Most probably the lunch session we're going to do.

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: Here's the problem for us. If we engage in name-calling against Pakistan, and if we effectively decide to walk away from the relationship, we hurt ourselves in two respects; on the margins, although they've not been a faithful, unstinting partner in counterterrorism, they still do have troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border which is where most of our terrorist opponents are.

MR. GOLDBERG: Right.

MR. BURNS: We still needed in that fight.

Secondly and more importantly, there's going to be a very messy drawdown in Afghanistan, and we're going to have to try to leave and not have the country completely splinter and maybe collapse in the process. Like it or not, Pakistan is going to write part of that history. It's been a major actor in the negotiations with Taliban. And so Richard's right, they're not our friend, they're not our partner. We ought not to be giving them billions every year, but we need to retain some influence and some interest there.

MR. GOLDBERG: But answer -- yeah, the --

MR. BURNS: To go to your question -- to go to your question, obviously the rise of India as the world's largest democracy, strategic partner of the United States, likeminded on how to handle China, likeminded on how to handle Afghanistan, this is a major preoccupation for us. And I'm -- I've been -- the last couple of days at Aspen trying to stress the point that sometimes in foreign

policy we see more integration between Republicans and Democrats than differences.

Here you have a case in India where President Clinton opened the door to a big relationship, President Bush built that relationship, and President Obama has maintained it. So you have bipartisan consensus. It's not an alliance. India is not going to be a treaty ally of the United States is too big, it's too proud, but the Indians see their strategic interest in coincidence with ours. That's a good thing, and the tricky balance for President --

MS. HARMAN: Except for Iran.

MR. GOLDBERG: You asked a different question. You asked us why is Pakistan not -- why has it not worked?

MR. BURNS: And I'm just answering as usual. I was --

MR. GOLDBERG: Are you getting to it?

MR. BURNS: As usual.

MS. HARMAN: He was going to defend, Richard.  
He's about to defend you.

MR. BURNS: I've been doing a lot of listening  
here, Richard, you know.

MR. HAASS: I don't want to fight.

MR. GOLDBERG: Dick's making a really good point.

MR. HAASS: I don't want to fight over a  
procedural issues.

(Laughter)

MR. BURNS: As we're diplomats. Very diplomatic.

MR. HAASS: Yeah, we're diplomatic. The tricky  
thing here is --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

MR. BURNS: There is still an India-Pakistan  
balance that we have to be mindful of in our own  
relationship, and if we try to insert India as our major  
partner in Afghanistan there's going to be a Pakistani  
reaction. So we have to be mindful of the Pakistanis from  
there. Pakistan's a failed state, India is very

successful, what else can we say?

MR. GOLDBERG: Can you go to that --

MR. HAASS: Building on what Nick was saying --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

MR. HAASS: -- I would say a few things. I think the definition of Pakistan from the get-go as a state whose identity was based upon religion set the stage for certain problems, particularly when it was built upon a society that had very powerful families, in some ways a feudal society where you had very few of the institutions that we would think of are pre-democratic plus very, very powerful geographic and tribal splits.

So it was very hard to build national identity against that backdrop. Among other things, the army became the most powerful institution in the country, so you just didn't have a lot of the prerequisites of democratic progression. And quite honestly, I don't see it -- I don't see it coming. A friend of mine, (inaudible), when he was dean at the Kennedy School, went

on to run Harvard, he used to have three boxes on his desk, "In," "Out," and "Too hard."

(Laughter)

MR. HAASS: And to some extent, Pakistan is in the "Too hard" box if your goal is that you think somehow you're going to turn it into a flourishing, liberal democracy, market-oriented country that's going to act responsibly in its national security -- isn't going to happen. So that sometimes in foreign policy, your goal is to bring about wonderful outcomes, this is not one of them.

Here the U.S. goal is to try to somehow prevent or forestall awful outcomes. And even -- that may not sound like it's ambitious, but in this case that is mighty ambitious for all the obvious reasons.

MS. HARMAN: Can I say something bad about India?

So --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

MS. HARMAN: -- isn't India still a close ally of Iran?

SPEAKER: No.

MS. HARMAN: No?

SPEAKER: No.

SPEAKER: No.

MS. HARMAN: Okay, got that wrong. Okay. But India just tested a nuclear weapon in the middle of this drama about getting Iran to allow full IAEA inspection, we're getting there, and so on --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

MS. HARMAN: -- and trying to prevent North Korea from testing more weapons, India tests a weapon. And India and Pakistan are both nuclear states and they both mistrust each other totally and they're still fighting over Kashmir. I'm not exactly sure what the interests are in Kashmir anymore, if I ever knew, and --

SPEAKER: Yeah.

MS. HARMAN: -- I'm sure these two know, Nick knows everything about Kashmir, I know he does. But I worry that by taking India's side in all this, we are

creating a bigger problem for ourselves, not just in Afghanistan, but I do think to remind "Ally from Hell," even if they're no longer our ally, let's say "frenemy from hell," 100 nukes, vulnerable nuclear sites, six or seven terror groups that are given safe haven in the country, an imploding civilian government, I mean, this is very dangerous to empower India at a time when Pakistan is so fragile.

MR. BURNS: I would say -- if I could just defend India for a second? Could I do that?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, defend India for one second and we'll come to --

MR. BURNS: Actually, I was going to defend Bush and Obama. I think Jane's right. India hasn't been a perfect friend of the United States. On Iran, until it was faced with U.S. sanctions in the last few months, the Indians were importing 14 percent of their oil from Iran. It's now below 9 percent. So they've reacted to the threat of sanctions.

MS. HARMAN: Okay. Well, good.

MR. BURNS: But I do think Jane is right, it's a really -- and as Richard said foreign policy is sometimes just a question of bad choices, which one do you choose. And we need a strategic military partnership with India because of China, to balance China. But if we overcompensate and put too much into the Indian relationship, we're going to send the Pakistanis off on a tear. And so there's got to be a little bit of balance here of restraint, and of restraining the Indians from trying to defeat the Pakistanis and Afghanistan on Kashmir. Every American administration since 1947, '48, has not taken India's side, has been neutral, and we are still neutral under President Obama. And I think that's the right place for us to be. There's no premium for us of supporting --

MS. HARMAN: But is there any way to resolve that issue?

MR. BURNS: Not in the short term.

MR. GOLDBERG: Let me go to an issue that is more urgent than Kashmir for American foreign policymakers. And the reason I'm sort of holding out Iran for last, we're going to go to questions in a few minutes, is that I was kind of hoping that Ehud Barak would walk through the door and so we'd be able to answer our questions. As many of the Israeli defense minister is coming to the festival today, but he's not here yet. And I wanted to ask him when he's going to attack Iran.

(Laughter)

MR. GOLDBERG: And I'm sure he would just -- you know, within the confines of the tent, share that information with us, but since he's not here I want to go to that direct question, and then we could broaden out on the Iran question.

Richard, I mean, give us your -- this has been, you know, a growing crisis. The Obama administration's number two fear -- number one is the collapse of the euro -- its number two fear is a preemptive strike on the

Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel before November. Where do you think we are -- and Jane, I want you to do this and Nick too -- where do you think we are, what are the chances of an attack, what are the chances that President Obama will give up on these set of negotiations that aren't going well, and if he's reelected move in 2013 toward military action with Iran?

MR. HAASS: Well, you've got different timelines going on here. You've got the timeline of Iran's nuclear endeavors and what they're doing is enriching uranium to various levels in ever-larger amounts. Since this meeting has begun, they've enriched more uranium. So uranium enrichment is happening in Iran as well as fortification of their new uranium enrichment facility and what Ehud Barak will talk about is what he calls his zone of immunity.

What he is worried is that the quantity of Iranian nuclear material as well as the quantity and quality of the cement they build around it to protect it,

that Iran will arrive at a point that any Israeli raid cannot achieve a decisive amount -- a meaningful enough result and that Iran will be left with enough of a nuclear capability that will still pose a threat to Israel. So Israel feels the pressure to act before this zone of immunity as he calls it, before this timeline runs its course. When will that happen, 6 months, a year, something like that -- (inaudible).

The Israelis know the United States couldn't militarily accomplish a lot more vis a vis Iran if we so chose, and they have -- they're not sure we will so choose. They're not confident in our willingness and they also know America has a much longer timeline because we have much stronger munitions, much larger Air Force, much larger missile force, we don't feel the same time-pressure of acting that Israel does. The other thing that came through -- and I was just in Israel last week -- the other thing that came through is Israeli nervousness about the negotiations.

They are extraordinarily worried that the United States and the other countries involved might be willing to settle for an outcome that would be enough for us, that we could tolerate a degree of capability and ambiguity on Iran's part, but would be too much for Israel. So all of this is going into the Israeli decision-making pot, and I would simply say that between now and November I think the odds are not negligible. I don't know if it's 3 out of 10, 4 out of 10, or something like that, but I think the odds are about that level that Israel will strike.

We'll give a little bit longer, in part because the new sanctions kicking in within a number of days, but I think they've essentially given up on these talks, that these talks will ever produce a result soon enough given again their concerns about the rate of Iranian enrichment and fortification. So my hunch is Ehud Barak and the prime minister of Israel, B.B. Netanyahu, will probably face a fateful decision sometime this fall, are they prepared to use military force given all the repercussions

for our bilateral relationship knowing what it would mean for our political process and are they prepared to do it given the possibilities obviously of Iranian retaliation.

I would simply say that the chances of Israel doing that are far more than negligible. I wouldn't say it's necessarily likely, but it's in that range of a real possibility.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane, is there any chance that the Israelis are simply bluffing?

MS. HARMAN: Well, I think some Israelis are opposed to military action.

MR. GOLDBERG: I'm talking about the two Israelis who matter.

MS. HARMAN: Oh, I think it's more than two who matter. I mean, I think with this new coalition, I think what Mofaz thinks matters, and I think there are probably, you know, three others that I could think of who matter too. But it's not a huge -- it's not the whole Knesset that matters, and it's probably not me that matters, hard

as it is for me to accept that. But --

MR. GOLDBERG: You matter to us.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: Let me -- sweet.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

MS. HARMAN: Let me add a few more points.

MR. GOLDBERG: This isn't the first rodeo Jane and I've done together.

MS. HARMAN: Yeah, we've had this going on for years.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MS. HARMAN: He's wonderful. He's wonderful.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, yeah.

MS. HARMAN: So first of all on our intelligence on Iran, that's something I have focused on for years, it's better, but it isn't great. And there were two coordinates to trying to get a picture of Iran. One is its capabilities, and I agree with Richard, that its enrichment capability even with some covert action that --

by somebody that slowed it down a little bit is increasing.

Whether -- nobody thinks Iran has a bomb now, but it has the enrichment capability and will have it in a near term whatever that means to produce bombs in a near term after that, think a few years maximum. The second coordinate is intentions, what does Iran really want to do with this? And noise is not an intention. A lot of countries make noise. What do the five people who matter in Iran really want to do and I don't think we know the answer to that. Attacking Iran, whether Israel does it, or we do with Israel, or somebody else does it, may delay Iran getting the bomb, but the day after is also a unity and resolve of unity inside the Iranian government.

It probably means that the government which is inside Iran, that the government which is now fragile and hobbled by sanctions might have the ability to survive. I mean some bad things happen after an attack that we have to measure too, or somebody has to measure. So I don't know what the calculus is. I think we should -- I think

Israel is waiting until sanctions fully kick in, which is next month. That hasn't happened yet.

MR. GOLDBERG: It's tomorrow.

MS. HARMAN: It's tomorrow? Oh, it's tomorrow.

MR. BURNS: Central Bank sanctions it, yeah.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

MS. HARMAN: Okay, well, I think Israel is not going to attack today.

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: So -- and anyway --

MR. GOLDBERG: Ehud Barak is going to be --

MS. HARMAN: Ehud Barak is here, so it'd be difficult.

(Laughter)

MR. GOLDBERG: Would you actually -- would you actually, we all know Ehud Barak, he would -- he's a classic wily commando, he might actually launch the attack from the Greenwald Pavilion.

(Laughter)

MR. GOLDBERG: There's a small chance.

MS. HARMAN: With you, Jeff. You'd be next to him.

MR. GOLDBERG: Or the St. Regis Hotel. Maybe the same.

MS. HARMAN: You -- but something I forgot to say about Egypt and it relates to all this, if only there were some progress on the two-party talks, the two-country talks, Israel-Palestine, I think that would send a signal I know --

MR. HAASS: Jane, we talked about this, come on -  
-

MS. HARMAN: Come on Richard, it would send a signal to the world that could change a lot of the calculations and the view of Israel. I do think that.

MR. GOLDBERG: And if bears could fly and they could probably have a new story --

MS. HARMAN: So I just -- I just started a fight. Yeah.

MR. GOLDBERG: It's not happening any --

MR. HAASS: Any of the -- it's not --

MS. HARMAN: You don't think it would matter?

MR. HAASS: For this -- for the consideration of Iran's nuclear question, Israel security, absolutely not.

MS. HARMAN: For Iran's consideration?

MR. HAASS: No ma'am, irrelevant.

MS. HARMAN: And you don't think it'd matter for Egypt's consideration either?

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane, I want to go to -- we're going to go to questions. I want Nick to deal with the --

MS. HARMAN: Okay.

MR. GOLDBERG: No, no, no.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: Does anybody agree with me that we ought to have progress? Hey --

MR. HAASS: On the sanctions, the --

MS. HARMAN: -- look at these, 10 brilliant people.

MR. GOLDBERG: The Harman caucus can meet afterwards in Doerr-Hosier room. I want Nick to go to the question and let me fold in one other question and then we're going to go to questions. The other aspect of this is do you believe that President Obama would use military force, not necessarily now, but use military force rather than allow Iran to cross the nuclear threshold?

MR. BURNS: Yes.

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay, go to the previous question then.

MR. BURNS: However, I don't think an Israeli attack is likely in 2012 for the following reason, and I know that some of you have heard this in the various panels we've been conducting here, it's been 32 years since we've had a sustained dialogue between Israel and Iran, since the Jimmy Carter administration, 32 years. So the President's in the third month of our multilateral

negotiations with Iran, those negotiations are not going to make progress this summer, if progress is going to be made. And there's a big question mark about that.

It's going to take a lot longer. So I would expect that the administration, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany -- those are the countries at the table on one side against Iran, are going to try to keep these going if they can, through most of this year. If that's true, there's no possibility of Israel striking -- firing a shot across the bow of all those countries, I don't -- I don't see it happening.

Here's the problem with diplomacy however. We have to stay at the table long enough to make sure we're searching, you know, doing everything we can to produce some kind of a deal with Iran. Answering the question of whether it's possible, we can't stay too long, or else Iran runs out the clock. It's simply continues to enrich uranium, and suddenly 3 years from now we're at the table and Iran announces they're nuclear-capable. So there is a

fine delicate balance. I would just make an appeal for diplomacy right now, and I know it's going to happen.

After this next desultory meeting -- we used that word the last time, where you're not going to see progress, the New York Times will report failure, all sorts of people will come out of the woodwork in our society to say President Obama is naïve, diplomacy is naïve, there's only one way to deal with these guys, turn to the military option. I think that would be a tragic mistake. If this is the only opportunity we're going to have to talk to these guys, and these are cynical, brutal people, we're going to have to extend these conversations longer than 3 months.

What else is President Obama doing? The Central Bank sanctions kicked in yesterday by the United States, the toughest sanctions we've ever imposed on Iran. The EU oil sanctions kick in Sunday and Monday. I would also say if that's the second leg of your policy, negotiations versus sanctions, simultaneously, we're going to need a

couple of months to see if the Iranians respond to those sanctions.

Third, and this really answers your question, I thought the President made a major move in his policy at the AIPAC conference.

When he came out and said at the AIPAC conference in March, I don't believe in containment. I'm not willing to live with the nuclear armed Iran because it will lead to the proliferation of nuclear powers in the Middle East -- that was an important moment given what he's already demonstrated on the al-Qaida front and in both Yemen and in the Afghan-Pak border. If talks break down and sanctions don't work, and if the President's reelected, I think the President will be very tough-minded on this, I imagine, and I think the military option will be very much under consideration in 2013 or '14.

MR. GOLDBERG: A quick point and then we're going to have mikes.

MR. HAASS: What worries me after my talks in Israel is the possibility that the Iranians will offer a policy of parking their nuclear capability just below having a nuclear weapon.

MR. GOLDBERG: Ninety percent capable.

MR. HAASS: The 90 percent, and the question is whether that's enough for us and the rest of the world and -- but still too much for Israel. And that's why I am skeptical a bit of negotiated outcome and the history of sanctions leads you to some modesty about what sanctions can accomplish, even though these are quite -- and I keep coming back to the Israeli timeline. The Israelis -- if they want to keep security in their own hands, if they want to not -- if you will franchise it out and I hope Iraq will make this clear, they do not have the luxury of waiting beyond a certain point. And that I think for them is what's behind this potential decision to act sooner rather than later.

MR. BURNS: And Richard -- and very briefly --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

MR. BURNS: And Richard, I think here -- if this all unfolds the way you've just suggested and it very well may, this is too important for us to see Israel get out ahead of the United States and attack against our will and in a timeline that we don't choose. And so here's the really difficult part of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, very close, we're friends, but we may have separate tactical interests here. And I would hope that the Obama-Netanyahu relationship could be repaired so that the United States can continue to lead -- if anyone's going to use force, it ought to be us, not Israel.

MR. HAASS: I -- we would be in a better position.

MR. GOLDBERG: We're going to go to questions. One right here is -- we're going to -- wait for the mike if you could because this is being recorded.

MR. ROGIN: Thanks very much. I'm Josh Rogin, Foreign Policy Magazine. I wanted to ask a question about

Pakistan. We've talked a lot today about the actions of Pakistan, but we've also talked about how Pakistan is engaged in internal struggle over its identity and its future. If you talk to the civilian leadership of Pakistan, the Pakistan Peoples Party, they always say the same thing. They say they are the ones in Pakistan who are more liberal, more democratic, more secular, more amenable to turning Pakistan towards western-focused foreign policy interests, but that the U.S. government has failed to realign its focus from the military and intelligence relationships to a strengthening of the partnership between those in Pakistan who would like to work with the U.S. more and those in the U.S. who would like to work with Pakistan more. They simply claim that we haven't supported the Pakistan Peoples Party in their struggle for democracy in Pakistan, a struggle that they seem to be losing. I'm wondering if you all see that as a valid point, if you think it's too late or can we still realign American policy towards the civilians in Pakistan

who seem to want to work with us and seem to --

MR. GOLDBERG: Why don't we go to -- yeah, Richard, do you want to do that?

MR. HAASS: You've got to deal with the reality that the military is the most powerful and capable institution in Pakistan. Second, a lot of our national security interests with Pakistan do involve national security type things. On the other hand, you know, we need to have a civilian side to it which explains the economic aid, supports for example, explains the support for say, Benazir Bhutto returning. The United States has pushed things, politically impacts it.

But the fact is though we were up against the reality where pushing on the civilian side of Pakistan is pushing on a very weak lead --

MS. HARMAN: Yeah.

MR. HAASS: -- particularly in the context of some of the national security priorities we've got. It's possible that the ties we've got in the balance is

slightly off. I don't disagree with the thrust of your question, but what I would challenge is even if we were -- put slightly more marbles on the civilian side and slightly few on the military side, the idea that that would have a transforming effect, I just don't buy it.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane, do you --

MS. HARMAN: There's also -- seems to me some responsibility on the part of the PPP and the Pakistani people. For example, they pay virtually no taxes in Pakistan and yet they come and ask the U.S. for aid. That's really not okay. And there's massive corruption in the civilian government in Pakistan, not to excuse the military for things that it does. So I think that complaint is basically unfounded and agree with Richard -- agree with Richard -- that because it's so weak, it's very difficult for our support which is there to get the kind of traction it might if that government took more responsibility itself.

MR. GOLDBERG: Do you want to --

MR. BURNS: Full agreement.

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. There's a question over here, this -- yeah. No, no, no, right next to you, sorry.

SPEAKER: Ladies first.

MR. GOLDBERG: Ladies first, she had her hand up, sorry.

MS. TEMPLE-RASTON: Dina Temple-Raston with National Public Radio. Question I have for you is a different kind of hotspot. I wonder if you can talk a little bit about the hotspot -- the al-Qaida hotspots that are growing up, where we should be worried? I know Secretary Panetta said it's strategically defeated, but clearly they're popping up in places we hadn't expected in North Africa et cetera.

MR. HAASS: The biggest challenge faced in the United States in this area is not strong states, it's weak states. And they moved into so-called ungoverned spaces not so much with the acquiescence of governments, but beyond the capacity of many of these governments, be it

Yemen, or Somalia, we're seeing elements of it. In Libya we see elements of it, and Nigeria, obviously Pakistan. And I think this is the future. There's no reason this might not happen in 6 or 10 or 15 or 20 more places where they will exploit lack or capacity of lack of will or both, and it's the reason that you do need a global effort, and I think you're going to see the kinds of combination of special forces, drones and the like is going to become the norm rather than the exception.

You're not going to see future Iraqs and Afghanistans. We're not going to be sending a 100,000-plus American militaries to occupy and remake other societies. But we are going to have to have a scalable counterterrorism policy that can go around the world and I think that's what you're beginning to see the U.S. military adapting to.

MR. GOLDBERG: Jane?

MS. HARMAN: Well, I was -- I'm going to say this on Dina's panel on Monday, but I think we have

eliminated al-Qaida core, that's the top management that lives in Pakistan. We're on about the fourth generation and these guys get whacked almost as soon as they take power. And I do support the --

MR. GOLDBERG: I like the way she says whacked.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: I do support the use of our drone program. However, playing whack-a-mole is not an adequate strategy and to get on top of what is a defused horizontally organized threat that does feed on weak states, we have to win the argument. It's not enough to have a kind of covert military strategy. We have to live our values. That means closing Guantanamo, and it means having the rule of law applied to all of our actions including our drone program which we are now doing. I commend John (phonetic), but my point is it's a real problem, but to defeat it, a military solution is not adequate.

MR. GOLDBERG: Can I just add one thing to the question and ask Nick to answer this? Does it matter -- does the bureaucratic al-Qaida matter as much anymore in the age of self-radicalizing terrorists? We have another issue entirely that we're not focused on because we're worried about organizations in Yemen or in the tribal areas.

MR. BURNS: Yeah.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

MR. BURNS: It certainly matters, but it's not sufficient just to defeat it because as you say it's implicit in the question, you've got in Somalia and in Sudan and in Yemen now offshoots of al-Qaida that are as virulent as Osama bin Laden ever was.

MS. HARMAN: Yeah.

MR. BURNS: So in answer to Richard's point I would just say this. Here's the good news, if there's any good news in this fight; there is no difference between the two political parties in our country on this. You've

seen a nearly complete even handoff from President Bush to President Obama. If anything President Obama has prosecuted the war with a greater ferocity and that's the right word for it than President --

MS. HARMAN: no question.

MR. BURNS: -- Bush did. We've learned a couple of lessons, and two come to my mind and I served in the last both Clinton and Bush administrations, putting a 100,000 -- 150,000 troops into Moslem countries occupying, as Richard says, trying to remake them, not the best way to get at this problem that you've asked us about which is counterterrorism.

And so you see a clear shift in Afghanistan in strategy. We've given up on counterinsurgency trying to remake every hamlet in Afghanistan. We're turning towards, you know, commandoes on distant basis, take them off the streets and strike at our enemies when we have to. And we'll have to do that not just in the Afghan-Pakistan border, but in Yemen and in Northeast Africa.

It's going to be a very tough fight. Last point, we can't go it alone. And here's how we've got just say unilateralism is over for us and isolationism is over too. We need a 1,000 allies in this and we've got them. The Arab countries are with us on this fight, the Europeans are, and most of the Asian allies. So it's not a hopeless picture for us.

MS. HARMAN: And Jeffrey --

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

MS. HARMAN: Just two more points. One, the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it scares us, at least is operating inside the tent. The rise of political Islam, Islamist parties is the nightmare for al-Qaida; al-Qaida wants to blow up the tent.

MR. BURNS: Right.

MS. HARMAN: So as these movements, hopefully some of them moderate, get traction in the Arab world, this is a good news story and we shouldn't forget that.

MR. GOLDBERG: I'm sorry, this has to be the last question. Make it a good one. Okay.

(Laughter)

SPEAKER: Okay, my name is --

MR. GOLDBERG: Really broad, overarching.

MILANTOFF: My name is Milantoff (phonetic). I'm from the Netherlands. My question is I have the feeling -- already an hour we talk about the symptoms -- of a disease which might be caused by fundamental things, distrust, humiliation, and disconnection between cultures.

MR. BURNS: Between?

MR. GOLDBERG: Cultures.

MR. BURNS: Cultures.

MILANTOFF: Between cultures, yes. How can maybe ordinary beings, civilians help to fight the cause of the disease instead of fighting the symptoms?

MR. BURNS: And the disease being? Be more specific --

MILANTOFF: Well, like the gap between cultures and the distrust, the fundamental fear and actually emotions between different parts of the global society.

MR. GOLDBERG: That was a broad question.

MR. BURNS: It's a broad question.

MR. GOLDBERG: It's a very broad question. Do you want to try first?

MR. HAASS: I'll try a piece of it. I think humiliation is an important force in international relations, more within countries. I actually think a lot of the Arab upheavals to some extent have humiliation at their core, and I think it makes a strong case for political participation, it makes a strong case for economic opportunity, it makes a strong case for doing things about -- against corruption for essentially giving people the say in their own destinies.

So I think if one could do things -- and this is not just a rule for governments, this is -- corporations can have a large role, non-profits, civil society,

educational institutions are important, but to the -- I think actually the principle source of rage in a lot of the world is humiliation at a personal level and to the extent that that can be -- it cannot be done away with, but it can be reduced and people can have other more positive outlets. I actually think it would have a beneficial effect.

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay.

MS. HARMAN: I agree with Richard.

MR. GOLDBERG: Duly noted.

MS. HARMAN: And -- yes.

MR. GOLDBERG: Want to stop there?

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: No. And I would commend an op-ed that Tom Friedman wrote the other day about how these revolutions were fueled by a lack of trust between people and their governments. But the response is now fueled by a lack of trust with each other. And building trust is a huge piece of getting to some place good. And the pitch I

wanted to make here is you can't build trust if you leave women out. And that unfortunately --

(Applause)

MS. HARMAN: They like that better than my Israel-Palestine point.

MR. BURNS: It's a better point.

MS. HARMAN: It's --

MR. GOLDBERG: It's a better point.

MR. BURNS: Crowd wisdom.

(Laughter)

MS. HARMAN: So they're going to have a panel later on Israel-Palestine. But anyway if we leave women out, and there's a serious danger of that happening in a number of these places, and not just leave them out of the political equation, leave them out of the economic equation, because women are drivers of the economies in many of these places. And we're also more than half of the talent pool.

MR. GOLDBERG: Nick, last word.

MR. BURNS: All right, thanks for your question. I would just say briefly psychology does play a part in international politics, no question about it, and I thought when President Obama went to Cairo in June of 2009 and gave that very impressive speech, it was a fine -- it was a good moment. But we need to do a lot more. And here's the political point just to ground it a little bit on what we might be able to do in the next few months as we go through our own election, if we paint every Islamist movement in the Arab world as radical and as, you know, not worthy of our respect and attention, that's going to be self-defeating. We're not in charge. The Arab people are going to be in charge of these 22 different revolutions.

They're all going to look differently, and I think particularly in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is not my dance card. I don't actually support most of what they believe in. But they won the election. We're going to have to give them a chance to work with us and to try to

define a relationship, and that is crossing a cultural, psychological barrier that you talked about, very important that we be a little bit sophisticated about the differences between some of these groups in the Arab world.

MR. GOLDBERG: Just a -- thank you very much -- just a programming note. At 11:30 tonight I'll be here with the ambassadors from Andorra and Liechtenstein.

(Laughter)

MR. GOLDBERG: So just meet me here. Try to get here early if you can. I want to thank the panel. It was fantastic. Thank you very much for coming. Thank you.

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